January 12, 2012

SPH

OCBC Research on 12 Jan 2012

Singapore Press Holdings (SPH) reported 1Q12 PATMI of S$97.5m or 6 S-cents per share, down 4.7% YoY. This was mainly due to a poorer performance from the Newspaper and Magazine segment, offset by added contributions from Clementi Mall. 1Q12 PATMI formed 26.3% of our FY12 forecast and is broadly in line with expectations. Clementi Mall contributed S$9m to revenues as it ramped up into full operations this quarter, its contributions buttressing earnings significantly. We like the visibility of recurring income from a suburban retail mall, and believe management’s strategy of building a stable counterweight to the print business is coming along nicely. Upgrade to BUY at a fair value estimate of S$3.99 and expected dividends of S$0.24 in FY12.

1QFY12 PATMI of S$97.5m or 6 S-cents per share. Singapore Press Holdings (SPH) reported 1Q12 PATMI of S$97.5m or 6 S-cents per share, down 4.7% YoY. This was mainly due to a poorer performance from the Newspaper and Magazine segment, offset by added contributions from Clementi Mall. 1Q12 PATMI formed 26.3% of our FY12 forecast and is broadly in line with expectations. The topline came in at S$332.4m which is 4.3% higher YoY due to Clementi Mall (rental income of S$9m) and new shows in the exhibitions business, but was partially offset by Newspaper and Magazine revenues falling 1.2% YoY.

Print advertisement performance softer YoY. As anticipated, we saw 1QFY12 revenues from print advertisement fell 1.2% YoY, driven by declines in both display and classified ads. Display ads demand from the fast moving consumer goods and banking/finance segments fell relative to 1QFY11, while demand increased from the property and fashion segment. There were also pressure from operating costs; newsprint and staff costs increased 4.2% and 1.5%, respectively.

Retail property strategy coming along nicely. Clementi Mall contributed S$9m to revenues as it ramped up into full operations this quarter, its added contributions buttressing earnings significantly. We like the visibility of recurring income from a suburban retail mall, and believe management’s strategy of building a stable counterweight to the print business is coming along nicely. With ~ S$1.2bn of investible funds in its arsenal, we expect SPH to add to its retail landlord portfolio over FY12-13.

Upgrade to BUY. We also saw a S$12.9m mark-down in available-for-sale assets, made up in part of listed equities in listed telcos and REITs. While more mark-downs could come if equity markets soften, we are not overly concerned given the yield and defensiveness of these holdings. Upgrade to BUY at a fair value estimate of S$3.99 and expected dividends of S$0.24 in FY12.

Singapore Banking Sector

Kim Eng on 12 Jan 2012

Maintain Underweight. Having declined 23-25% from their 2011 peaks, Singapore banks appear cheap. We would nevertheless argue that present valuations largely reflect and justify the cyclical downturn in returns that the industry is witnessing, as well as flat earnings this year. The primary risk is of economic growth undershooting expectations while from an operational standpoint, we see little change in the challenging operating environment this year to warrant a more positive stance just yet. We retain our Sell calls on DBS, OCBC and UOB.

In pursuit of returns. Returns are proving more elusive amid i) competitive pressures and NIM compression; ii) capital market volatility; iii) increasing risk aversion; and iv) rising costs. We estimate a blended ROE of 10.5% for 2012 which is not only lower than the long-term mean of 12%, but also below average returns achieved during the GFC.

Challenges remain. Against the backdrop of Singapore’s GDP growth tapering to 3% in 2012 from 4.8% (est) in 2011, we expect cumulative loan growth for the three banks to decelerate to 10% this year from 27% in 2011. NIM compression is likely to persist but we expect a more moderate compression of 3bps this year from 11bps in 2011. Other challenges include potentially higher charge-off rates amid asset quality deterioration, as well as capital market volatility which could impact fee income expansion and fair value reserves.

Flat earnings in 2012. Taking the above factors into consideration, we expect the cumulative operating profit of the three banks to grow by a marginal 5% in 2012. On the back of higher credit charge rates, we expect cumulative recurring net profit to be flat YoY. In contrast, cumulative operating profit for the three banks stalled with growth of just 1.9% back in 2008. With rising credit costs, total net profit contracted by 15.4% in that year.

Valuations not much to shout about just yet. Trading at an average 2012 P/BV of 1.1x presently against a long-term mean of 1.5x, valuations appear attractive from a historical perspective. We would nevertheless argue that this is very much on par with the cyclical downturn in returns for the industry. Moreover, at a prospective PER of 10.7x for 2012, valuations are marginally higher than the regional average of 10.0x ex Taiwan and South Korea. This is not entirely appealing given the fact that earnings are expected to meander along with growth at just about 0.6% versus 7.3% for the region in 2012.

In search of returns
That there are headwinds on the external front is a given fact. This aside, however, the primary challenge confronting Singapore banks today is that generating returns continues to be a struggle, and we expect ROEs to dip below the global financial crisis (GFC) levels.

A glance back at recent results points to a decent 23% YoY growth in cumulative reported net profit for the first nine months of 2011. Recurring net profit, however, expanded by just 3% YoY. Despite gross loans growing at a breakneck pace of 27% YoY and total assets expanding by 19% YoY, operating income inched up by just 4% YoY while operating profit actually contracted 1% YoY.

Negative JAWS persisting… What is indicative from the table above is that while income generation has been a challenge, profitability has been further impeded by negative JAWS (faster growth in expenses relative to income). Aside from a brief spell in 2009, expenses have generally been increasing at a faster rate than income since 2007. As a result, the aggregate cost/income ratio for the 3 banks has risen from a historical low of about 38% to 43% presently.


…due in part to rising staff costs. That overheads have been rising is largely a function of increasing staff costs, which now account for about 56% of total overheads versus a low of 49% in 2003. DBS, which saw its monthly staff cost/employee dip in 2008 as a result of a retrenchment exercise then, has seen its costs climb back up to precrisis levels.

Returns more elusive. Consequently, while the economy has been expanding post-GFC, returns are proving more elusive and more difficult to generate amid i) competitive pressures and net interest margin (NIM) compression; ii) volatility in capital markets; iii) a shift towards less risky assets; and iv) rising costs.

While DBS has managed to sustain its ROE in recent quarters, income support has come mainly from fees/trading income, which brings into question the sustainability of returns. OCBC, meanwhile, has seen its ROE slip 4.5ppts from a peak of 14% in 1Q10, while UOB has witnessed a 6.3-ppt decline from its peak to 9.3% in 3Q11. Operating profit generated from risk-weighted assets, meanwhile, appears to have peaked as well and is close to pre-crisis lows for OCBC and UOB.


Does it get easier from here?
Probably not yet, particularly amid expectations of slower economic growth ahead. While Singapore has avoided a technical recession, expectations remain tempered as the economy continues to be buffeted by turbulence on the external front.


GDP momentum to taper off
GDP growth of 3% for 2012. Being a very open economy, the whipsawing of Singapore’s economy epitomises the state of the external environment. Singapore’s 4Q11 real GDP shrank 4.9% QoQ (3Q 2011: +1.5%), the second QoQ contraction in the year, but not on a consecutive basis, as the technical definition of a recession requires. YoY growth slowed to 3.6% (3Q2011: +5.9%).

Our in-house GDP growth projection for 2012 stands at +3% (2011: +4.8%), supported by the services sector (especially non-financial services), pharmaceutical industry, public housing and infrastructure (MRT upgrade and extension), although external factors such as the prolonged Eurozone debt crisis, sluggish US growth and China’s economic slowdown, will be a drag on manufacturing – especially E&E – on top of the recent additional measure to cool property prices.

As it stands, there is a fairly strong 0.8 correlation between the general business expectations manufacturing) index and Singapore’s GDP growth, with the latter lagging the former by about 3 months. The former turned negative in 3Q11, portending slower growth ahead, and this was eventually borne out. We await the release of 4Q11 numbers. The official GDP growth forecast for 2012 is currently 1-3%, and the primary risk at this stage is of economic growth under-shooting expectations.

Slower loan growth ahead
US$ loans swell. Loan growth in the first nine months of 2011 has been robust, with cumulative gross loans for the 3 banks expanding at an accelerated pace of 27% YoY. What is evident from the charts below is that much of this growth has been driven primarily by US$ loan growth, which jumped 69% YoY in 3Q11 versus a more paced increase of 16% YoY for S$ loans. By end-September 2011, US$ loans accounted for 25% of total loans versus 16% in 3Q09.

Trade finance loans. The surge in US$ loans has been largely driven by demand from Chinese companies for US$-denominated trade financing lines.

31% of DBS’ total loans. US$ loans have grown at the fastest pace for OCBC (+90% YoY in 3Q11 versus 62% for DBS and 59% for UOB) but make up a larger proportion of DBS’ total loan portfolio (31% of total loans) compared to OCBC (26%) and UOB (15%).

US$ trade finance loans carry low risk and low yields. While US$ trade financing loans have expanded at a rapid pace, they are typically of short duration (< 1 year) and usually secured against goods/deposits from the borrower. As such, they are relatively low risk (and low yielding), which would partially explain why DBS’ and OCBC’s riskweighted assets (RWA) have expanded at a much slower pace of 14% YoY (20% for UOB) despite the more rapid growth in such loans.

US$ lending is likely to taper off in 2012 as global trade cools and as US$ funding cost rises. An added inhibiting factor, in our view, is the lack of corresponding US$ liquidity to fund such lending. As it stands, DBS’ US$ loan/deposit (L/D) ratio is already at an all-time high of 171%, while OCBC’s is 166% and UOB’s is just above 100%.

Property lending likely to come off too. We expect the recent imposition of the additional buyer’s stamp duty to take some wind out of property (particularly private residential) demand. Mortgages account for about 25-30% of the banks’ Singapore loan portfolio, with private residential loans making up 80-90% of such mortgages. Property development loans, meanwhile, account for a further 10-20% of total domestic loans.

Overall loan growth to moderate to 10%. Taking the above factors into consideration, we expect sector loan growth to moderate into 2012 and expect cumulative loan growth for the three banks to moderate to
10% from 27% in 2011.

NIM compression has had a negative impact on earnings. The singular factor that has had the most dampening impact on earnings is NIM compression, which has persisted over the past two years. 2010 saw average NIMs of the 3 banks contract by about 23 bps, and we expect another 11 bps squeeze in 2011.

Nevertheless, we expect some NIM stability into 2012, and impute a marginal 3 bps compression.

Positively:
a) Anecdotal evidence suggests that while pricing in the retail market remains tight, some pricing power has returned to corporate lending, as foreign banks cut back on their lending activities.

b) Interbank rates are stabilizing. Interbank rates have been declining over the past two years, but appear to have bottomed out at about 0.34%, with some recovery to 0.40% presently.

c) The Singapore Swap Offer Rate (SOR) has recovered. Having temporarily slipped into negative territory in September 2011, the 3- month SOR has since bounced up to close to 0.6%, and is higher than the 3-month SIBOR of 0.40%

On the flip side, funding costs are unlikely to ease anytime soon. Cheaper CASA deposits are proving harder to come by these days, while L/D ratios have been rising rapidly. We would expect the banks to cap their L/D ratios at about 90% and with L/D ratios already at 87-88% presently, there is less room to manoeuver in this regard.

That said, L/D ratios have been skewed upwards by tight US$ liquidity. US$ L/D ratios range from just over 100% for UOB to 171% for DBS. S$ liquidity meanwhile remains adequate while liquidity in other major regional currencies is manageable, in our view. As such, the reining in of US$ loans would improve liquidity conditions.

Higher credit costs ahead?
Asset quality healthy. To date, asset quality continues to strengthen and there is little indication of stress to the loan books as yet, except for an uptick in 3Q11 NPLs for UOB, which has been attributed to lumpy corporate loan exposure to some clients in the transport sector. NPL ratios are respectable at less than 1.5% across the 3 banks, with commendable loan loss coverage of 120-140%.

However, the prospect of an economic slowdown brings this concern to the fore, for during the GFC, average gross NPL ratios across the 3 banks rose 14 bps in 2008 and 62 bps in 2009. Credit charge-off rates, meanwhile, jumped from 34 bps in 2007 to 72 bps in 2008 and 94 bps in 2009.33

Downside risk. What we have factored in to date is a 10 bps increase in NPL ratios in 2012 and 6 bps rise in 2013, while our credit charge-off rate estimates would appear fairly benign at this stage at 30-31 bps for 2012-2013 versus 27bps in 2011. Downside risk therefore is of a greater-than-expected deterioration in asset quality.

The impact of capital market volatility
Impact on two fronts. Capital market volatility is unlikely to abate anytime soon, and impacts the banks on two fronts: a) a hit to fee income; and b) potential write-downs in available-for-sale (AFS) reserves which dampen book value.

Fee income contraction expected. Fee income is susceptible to fluctuations in capital market activity. This revenue source contracted by 11% in 2008 and a further 1% in 2009 on a cumulative basis. On expectation that volatility will persist, we have factored in a 5% contraction in 2012.

Little differentiation in impact. We see little differentiation in the fee income structure across the 3 banks, with capital market-related fees (fund management, futures broking and investment-related) accounting for 24-25% of total fee income and trade-related fees making up 18- 19%. Fee income, meanwhile, accounts for about 21-23% of total income.

A drag on book value. The other risk amid market volatility is that of potential write-downs to investment values, which in turn would be a drag on book values. 2008 saw a significant write-down in AFS reserves, largely from the banks’ exposures to collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). 3Q11, meanwhile, saw a dip in the shareholders’ funds of UOB and OCBC, with the former’s AFS reserve turning negative on the back of a S$492m mark-to-market provision against its overseas investments. OCBC saw a S$228m decline in the value of its AFS investments in 3Q, primarily on Bank of Ningbo.

No CDOs but some Eurozone exposure this time round. UOB’s total European debt exposure stood at S$2.1b as at end-Sep (9.4% of shareholders’ funds), a tad lower than DBS’s S$2.4b (8.5% of shareholders’ funds). The difference, however, is that while DBS’s exposure to European banks (excluding European government debt) is just S$211m, or 0.7% of shareholders’ funds, UOB’s European bank exposure is S$1.2b, which is a larger 5.4% of shareholders’ funds.


OCBC’s investment portfolio appears more resilient at this stage. Negligible exposure to the Eurozone aside, OCBC’s investment portfolio appears more resilient at this stage, with a lower 45% exposure to non-government securities (corporate debt and equities), versus 50% for DBS and 55% for UOB.

Earnings forecasts
Flat earnings in 2012. Taking the above factors into consideration, we expect the cumulative operating profit of the 3 banks to grow by a marginal 5% in 2012. On the back of higher credit charge rates, we expect cumulative recurring net profit to be flat YoY.


This compares against a 15% contraction in 2008 earnings. Back in 2008, cumulative operating profit for the three banks stalled with growth of just 1.9%. Including rising credit costs, total net profit contracted by 15.4% during the year.

Valuations
2011 – a year of underperformance. The banking sector generally underperformed in 2011. Against a loss of 17% for the STI, OCBC’s share price declined 20.7% YoY while DBS’ share price dropped 9.6%
YoY. UOB eked out a slight out-performance though there was little to cheer about, with its share price down 16.1% YoY.

A function of the economy. That the banks underperformed last year is probably not too surprising, given their lacklustre earnings and the uncertain state of the economy. As the chart below shows, there is some correlation between economic growth and banks’ share prices, albeit a relatively weak one at 0.4.

Present valuations are decent… The sector as a whole trades at a prospective 2012 PER of 10.7x, which is a 22% discount to the longterm sector PER average of 13.7x. The sector also trades at a prospective 2012 P/BV of 1.09x, a 26% discount to its long-term average of 1.47x.

…but largely reflect the cyclical downturn in returns and earnings momentum. While valuations have come off, this is to a large extent representative of, and justified by, expectations of flat earnings this year as well as the cyclical downturn in ROEs, in our view. As per our estimates, the blended ROE for the sector currently stands at about 10.5% for 2012 versus the long-term average of about 12.1%. Moreover, ROEs have started trending below the levels recorded during the GFC itself.

Still some distance from trough. Current PER and P/BV valuations are about 34% and 33% away from the trough PER and P/BV (in March 2009) valuations of 7.1x and 0.73x respectively.

Not entirely appealing from a regional perspective. While admittedly P/BV valuations for Singapore banks rank low, so do their ROEs, which are the third lowest in the region after Taiwan and South Korea. PER valuations for Singapore banks, at 10.7x for 2012, is marginally higher than the regional average of 10.0x ex Taiwan and South Korea. This is not entirely appealing in view of the fact that earnings are expected to meander along with growth at just about 0.6% versus 7.3% for the region (ex Taiwan and South Korea) in 2012.

Recommendations
Valuations appear cheap from a historical basis but as we have pointed out above, they do not appear compelling from a regional perspective, not with expectations that earnings will likely stagnate this year and with ROEs trailing levels recorded even during the GFC.

The primary risk as it stands is of earnings under-shooting expectations on slower-than-expected economic growth while from an operational standpoint, we see little change in the challenging operating environment this year to warrant a more positive stance. Our Underweight call on the sector is retained, as are our Sell calls on DBS, UOB and OCBC.

DBS (Target price: S$11.50, target P/BV: 0.9x, 2012 ROE: 9.7%)
On the plus side, DBS’s valuations are the cheapest among the Singapore banks with a low P/BV of 0.9x. Nevertheless, valuations are low for a reason, with its single-digit ROE of 9.7% in 2012 lagging the industry average.

With exposure to two highly open economies (Singapore and Hong Kong), DBS’s earnings are more vulnerable to economic headwind relative to its peers, in our view. Moreover, as earnings growth in recent quarters has largely been supported by fees/trading income, sustaining this momentum could be a challenge.
With more of a corporate focus than its peers, DBS’ domestic NIMs are likely to benefit from improved pricing on corporate (as opposed to retail) loans. At the group level, however, any improvement is likely to be capped by its high HK$ and US$ L/D ratios of 132% and 171% respectively.

OCBC (Target price: S$7.30, target P/BV: 1.1x, 2012 ROE: 10.8%)
Our favourite of the 3 banks for its strong credit risk management (impeccable asset quality and highest loan loss coverage/lowest credit charge-off rates) and burgeoning wealth management franchise. At this juncture, however, valuations do not warrant entry just yet, in our view.

We expect the bank’s investment portfolio to be least impacted by market fluctuations, but the overall effect is likely to be amplified by volatility in Great Eastern’s portfolio, which is only to be expected. Great Eastern, nevertheless, has a solid franchise and its business continues to expand at a stable pace.

Also a positive is that Bank of Singapore continues to grow and contribute to group earnings, with assets under management totaling US$29b at end-September 2011. Since buying ING’s Asian private banking business in 2009, OCBC’s fee income has expanded from 15% of total income in 4Q08 to 23% in 3Q11. Separately, we expect OCBC’s Malaysian operations (which made up 25% of pretax profit in 9M11) to provide some buffer to group earnings.

UOB (Target price: S$14.20, target P/BV: 1.0x, 2012 ROE: 10.8%)
Our least favoured Singapore bank at present. Of the 3 banks, we expect UOB to see higher NIM compression in 2012, mainly from its regional operations in Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia. The clampdown on the property sector, meanwhile, is likely to take the wind out of loan expansion, particularly for UOB, which has a larger exposure to the private residential property market compared to the other two banks.

That it bucked industry trends with an uptick in NPLs in 3Q11 is reason to be cautious, while its Eurozone debt exposure could further dampen book value expansion through mark-to-market losses.

January 11, 2012

CDL

OCBC Research on 11 Jan 2012

CDL was part of a consortium that put in the top bid (S$388.1m or S$495 psf) for a 99-year residential GLS site at Mt. Vernon Rd yesterday. We estimate the breakeven ASP at ~S$880 psf. Assuming a 33% stake and ASP of S$1,050 psf, we expect an accretion of four S-cents to CDL’s RNAV and three S-cents to fair value. Recall that the consortium had acquired a nearby GLS residential site at Bartley Rd in Mar 11 at S$621 psf (25% higher). The starkly lower top bid, in our view, reflects clearly increased cautiousness among developers. Maintain HOLD on CDL with a higher fair value estimate of S$8.38 versus S$8.35 previously (35% discount RNAV).

Won tender for GLS residential site at Mt. Vernon Rd. A CDL subsidiary, Sunmaster Holdings Pte. Ltd., was part of a consortium that put in the top bid (S$388.1m or S$495 psf) for a 99-year residential GLS site at Mt. Vernon Rd yesterday. This bid was 7.6% above the 2nd bidder in a tender exercise that attracted five bidders. For this development, we estimate the breakeven ASP at ~S$880 psf. Assuming a 33% effective stake and average selling prices of S$1,050 psf, we expect an accretion of four S-cents to CDL’s RNAV and three S-cents to its fair value estimate. Note that transactions over the last year at nearby 8@Woodleigh, a 99-year condominium, are at S$1,100 psf on average. Hence we believe that the price paid for this site is fairly reasonable, despite uncertainty in the domestic residential space, and expect the share price to have a neutral/slightly positive reaction on this acquisition.

Top bid is 20% lower than that at nearby site in Mar 11. Recall that the consortium had acquired a nearby GLS residential site at Bartley Rd/Lorong How Sun in Mar 11 at a price which was 25% higher (S$621 psf). Though the Mt. Vernon site is further out from the MRT station, the starkly lower top bid and reduced bidder interest (there were eight at the Mar 11 tender) clearly reflects heightened cautiousness among developers, in our view. Moreover, we think the bid could also have reflected, to an extent, additional strategic value the site holds for the consortium; a stronger bid would prevent otherwise even softer land prices in that vicinity and also provide the flexibility to control the launch schedules of both sites.

Maintain HOLD at S$8.38. While the domestic residential outlook remains murky, we think the downside for this acquisition is limited given the price paid. Maintain HOLD on CDL with a higher fair value estimate of S$8.38 versus S$8.35 previously (35% discount RNAV). 

SPH


The Business Times on January 11, 2012

SPH profit dips 4.7% in Q1
By JAMIE LEE

SINGAPORE Press Holdings (SPH) achieved higher recurring earnings for its fiscal first quarter but lower investment income resulted in a 4.7 per cent fall in net profit.

Net profit for the three months ended Nov 30 was $97.5 million, down from $102.3 million for the corresponding year-ago period. Earnings per share stayed at six cents.

Group operating revenue for the quarter rose 4.3 per cent year on year to $332.4 million. A strong showing from the property segment and improved performance from its Internet and exhibitions businesses cushioned the fall in turnover from its newspaper and magazine segment.

This contributed to a 4.2 per cent year-on-year increase in recurring earnings to $121.2 million. The group's recurring earnings for its media and property businesses refer to profit before investment income and share of net loss/profit of associates and jointly-controlled entities.

The period saw a 90.3 per cent drop in net income from investments to $587,000 due to unrealised foreign exchange losses on investments stemming from volatility in the financial markets.

Rental income for the group rose 27.2 per cent to $46.9 million for the quarter. Clementi Mall, which started operations in Q2 2011, recorded rental income of $9 million while revenue from Paragon rose 2.6 per cent, thanks to higher rental rates.

Operating revenue from the group's other businesses surged 42 per cent to $23.3 million, with higher income from newly acquired shows in the exhibitions business.

But revenue from the group's newspaper and magazine business fell 1.2 per cent to $262.3 million. Print advertisement revenue slipped 1.2 per cent to $204 million, while circulation revenue fell 1.8 per cent to $50.3 million.

Staff costs rose 1.5 per cent to $88.3 million.

Materials, consummables and broadcasting costs rose 2.2 per cent to $42.5 million, with higher newsprint prices partially cushioned by a favourable exchange rate.

Other operating expenses rose 16 per cent to $57.1 million, as a result of cost incurred from the commencement of operations at Clementi Mall and higher overheads due to increased business activities and inflationary pressures

'The outlook for the global economy remains fraught with uncertainties,' said CEO Alan Chan. 'The group will strive for a sustained performance in the core newspaper business while pursing growth in business adjacencies.'

Shares of SPH closed yesterday three cents higher at $3.70 prior to the results announcement.

SGX


The Business Time on 11 Jan 2012

Analysts cut SGX estimates after disappointing December
By KENNETH LIM

ANALYSTS are trimming their forecasts for Singapore Exchange on the back of disappointing December trading volumes and macro concerns in the year ahead.

With SGX expected on Monday to report its second-quarter results, analysts are expecting revenue of $150 million to $167 million for the three months ended December 2011 and net profit of $63 million to $75 million, according to a poll by BT.

DMG & Partners yesterday downgraded SGX to sell and cut its price target to $5.40 from $6.20, citing lacklustre December data.

Other analysts were also downbeat. 'The problem is that 2Q's poor results might not be a one-off,' wrote CIMB analysts Kenneth Ng and Daniel Lau in a note.

'Market activity is lethargic. Against a backdrop of culled (investment banking) headcount, hedge fund closures, more can-kicking and intermittent fears of a banking contagion, investors cannot be expected to stampede back in a big way.'

The catalyst for some of the recent pessimism was December's trading volume data, which came in below expectations. Total securities market turnover dropped 40 per cent year on year in December to 15.1 billion shares, while the value of trades done was 41 per cent lower at $16.7 billion.

'Yes, the December quarter is seasonally slow but even then, (average daily value traded) was still 36 per cent lower than 2009/2010 levels, close to 2008 levels,' the CIMB analysts wrote.

CIMB has an 'underperform' rating on the stock with a 12-month price target of $5.86. SGX common stock closed at $6.16 on Tuesday.

Credit Suisse analyst Arjan van Veen, who cut his full-year SGX earnings estimate by 3 to 4 per cent after the December numbers, said SGX still offered a longer-term growth story and an Asian regional gateway.
'However, nearer term, SGX's fortunes are much more linked to current market volumes, which remain very weak,' Mr van Veen said.

He expected the exchange's historical 90 per cent dividend payout ratio to support valuations, but still rated the stock 'underperform' with a price target of $5.85.

Kim Eng analyst James Koh was the contrarian bull, maintaining a 'buy' recommendation with a 12-month target price of $6.78. Mr Koh pointed out that non-trading value-linked income could offer some upside.
Such income provide 'structural growth outside of the volatility of market trading conditions', Mr Koh wrote. 'One bright spot is derivatives volume, which has shown robust growth right up until last month.'

Taking a broader perspective, DMG analyst Leng Seng Choon recommended selling SGX and buying Hong Kong Exchange. Hong Kong's ability to attract international offerings with its huge hinterland and its abundance of Chinese yuan-denominated securities give it the edge over Singapore.

'SGX's efforts to drive liquidity is ongoing - we believe there will be some fruits, but investors are less convinced that it will have a significant impact within the next one to two years,' Mr Leng said.

CDL

Kim Eng on 11 Jan 2012


Relative outperformer. Since the market sell-down in August last year, City Developments Limited (CDL) has been a relative outperformer (-14.2%) compared to big-cap peers CapitaLand (-19.5%) and Keppel Land (-39.2%), even slightly outperforming the Straits Times Index (-15.4%). While its recent residential launches have continued to attract keen demand, its exposure to some luxury projects could pose an overhang on shares. Maintain Hold.


Meeting upgraders’ demand. Last week, CDL launched the 466-unit Executive Condominium called The Rainforest at Choa Chu Kang. Priced at around $720 psf, it is in line with our expectation of $700 psf. When applications closed two days ago, more than 800 applications were received. The early launch was timely, as we expect mass market prices to fall by up to 20% by end-2013 amid weakening economic fundamentals and ample options for homebuyers.


Potential overhang from high-end projects. The introduction of the Additional Buyer’s Stamp Duty (ABSD) last month is also likely to further curtail demand for high-end properties. While headline ASPs may stay resilient, we anticipate an effective 10% drop in selling prices as developers begin to absorb the ABSD either partially or in full to attract buyers, thus eroding their profit margins. If this eventuates, it will lower our RNAV estimate for CDL by 2%, or 27 cents per share.


China exposure still small. CDL recently made a RMB540m acquisition in Chongqing, making it its third project in China. The land cost translates to RMB4,968 psm ppr and we estimate a breakeven of RMB11,000 psm for the project, which would add 4 cents per share to CDL's RNAV. While stocks with China exposure have been negatively affected, CDL's post-acquisition exposure is still relatively small.
Fairly-valued bellwether. On balance, CDL seems fairly valued at this moment. We maintain our Hold recommendation, with the target price reduced from $11.05 to $9.38, pegged at a 25% discount to RNAV.

Fairly-valued bellwether. On balance, CDL seems fairly valued at this moment. We maintain our HOLD recommendation, with the target price reduced from $11.05 to $9.38, pegged at a 25% discount to RNAV in line with trading conditions in 2008.


Brisk sales from mass market projects

Warming up to The Rainforest. CDL’s latest launch is the 466-unit Executive Condominium (EC) known as The Rainforest at Choa Chu Kang. Launched last Wednesday, more than 800 applications were received when applications closed two days ago, indicating that the underlying demand from upgraders is still strong. The units were priced at around $720 psf, in line with our original expectation of $700 psf. Assuming 50% of the applicants eventually go on to book a unit, the project could easily achieve 85% sales. 


Concentrating on mass market launches. The Rainforest is just one of the few mass market launches that CDL has undertaken in recent months. Last November, it rolled out the leasehold condominium called The Palette at Pasir Ris Grove. To date, over 80% of the 450 units released have been sold at an ASP of $880 psf. Earlier in July, the group launched another EC project called Blossom Residences at Bukit Panjang and has sold nearly 80% of the units at an ASP of $680 psf.


Timing of future launches critical. In our view, while the demand for mass market projects appears to be still strong, the ASP may come under downward pressure from 2H12 as weakening economic fundamentals coincide with possibly more launches of such developments, ECs and HDB Build-to-Order projects. We believe that the prices of mass market projects would correct by 20% by end-2013. Against such a backdrop, CDL’s timing of new mass market launches will be critical. Looking at its landbank, the group may try to roll out Bartley Residences, the 698-unit leasehold development beside the Bartley MRT Station, by 1H12. In lowering our ASP assumptions for its unlaunched mass market projects by 20%, we cut our RNAV per share by 26 cents, or a 2% reduction.

High-end segment a no-go. The introduction of the Additional Buyer’s Stamp Duty (ABSD) last month is likely to further curtail demand for high-end properties, which has largely been buoyed by foreign demand. While headline ASPs may stay resilient, we anticipate an effective 10% drop in selling prices as developers begin to absorb the ABSD either partially or in full to attract buyers, thus eroding their development margins. In lowering our ASP assumptions for high-end projects by 10%, CDL’s RNAV per share is reduced by 2%, or 27 cents. 


Keep an eye on The Residences at W. While most of CDL’s high-end projects are still in the early stages of construction, one project that stands out is The Residences at W at Sentosa Cove. Having already obtained its Temporary Occupation Permit (TOP) in 2Q11, the group has sold only 21 out of the 228 units to-date. Under the Residential Property Act, it now faces a diminishing timeframe of slightly under 18 months to sell the remaining 207 units.

Making further inroads in China


Second acquisition in Chongqing. CDL recently made a RMB540m acquisition in Chongqing’s Yuzhong District (渝中区), making it its third project in China and second in the city of Chongqing. The land cost translates to RMB4,968 psm ppr and we estimate a breakeven of RMB11,000 psm for the project. Eighty per cent of the GFA will be for residential use, potentially yielding 900 homes, while the remaining 20% will be for commercial use.


The site is located near Huang Hua Yuan (黄花园) Metro station, just one metro station away from the Jiefangbei (解放碑) CDB area, with waterfront views of the Jialing River. A project nearby called City Heights (协信公馆) by local developer Sincere Holding has a current ASP of RMB17,000 psm. We have assumed a conservative ASP of RMB15,000 psm for the residential component and a capital value of RMB27,000 psm for the commercial component, translating to a potential RNAV accretion of just 4 cents per share.


Second acquisition in Chongqing not a mere coincidence. While China’s overall economic outlook still draws dissenting views, the city of Chongqing continues to be a shining light. Based on the latest reports, Chongqing achieved GDP growth of 16.5% last year, making it the fastest-growing city in China. In addition, as CDL already has a project team in place for the E-ling site, the group could leverage on those resources and potentially reap economies of scale.


China exposure still small. We estimate that post-acquisition, CDL’s exposure to China is approximately 10% of the group’s Gross Development Value. Despite the market’s general aversion to companies with exposure to China real estate, we think CDL’s exposure is still small.



January 10, 2012

F&N

Kim Eng on 6 Jan 2012


(FNN SP, $6.28, Buy, TP $7.18)
Steadfast focus on property in past decade. Fraser and Neave (F&N) is one of Singapore’s oldest listed blue chip companies and has undergone numerous transformations in the last 128 years. From 2000 to 2007, the conglomerate focused steadfastly on the property market under the leadership of Dr Han Cheng Fong, its former chief executive officer (CEO). Dr Han was a property man through and through. Before F&N, he was the deputy chairman and CEO of DBS Land, which was merged with Pidemco Land in 2000 to form CapitaLand. During his seven-year stewardship, F&N’s non-property-related businesses took a back seat, profit-wise. By 2007, the food and beverage (F&B) segment, including beer and dairies, accounted for only 32% of total profit while soft drinks, the original core business, contributed a mere 6%.


Property in retreat but still a strong contributor. At the current cycle, property accounted for 55% of FY10 profit before tax. Due to the cyclical nature of the business, property counters generally trade at steep discounts to RNAV and only achieve a premium at their most bullish. For instance, at the height of the property market cycle in late 2007, F&N traded at a premium of close to 40% over its RNAV. But it was sold down to more than 40% discount to RNAV in early 2009. The group also has minority stakes in public companies such as Fung Choi Media (29.5% stake) but this move does not appear to have done shareholder value much good (even if it did, the flow of benefits has not been clear). We therefore believe that F&N as a conglomerate cannot fully realise its value for shareholders. The following are some options management had considered at some point and which we believe are worth pursuing.


Option 1: Shed weight through streamlining. Even though F&N has quite a number of non-core and strategically out-of-line assets and operations, we like the fact that the group constantly reviews its portfolio. Over the past 24 months, it has completed 12 divestments and asset injections into its sponsored REITs. Just recently, it sold its 29.5% stake in China Dairy Group for $38m. Other notable divestments include the sale of Shanghai Asia Pacific Breweries and Jiangsu Dafuhao Breweries for $162m, Bedok Point for $127m and a 21.4% stake in Kingway Brewery for $205m.


The next major asset to go could be F&N’s printing and publishing business, Times Publishing Group (TPG). In fact, TPG was put up for sale in August 2008. A deal was brokered but had to be aborted because the prospective buyer could not secure financing amid the adverse credit market conditions then. Private equity firms 3i Group and CVC Capital were reported to be among the bidders for this business that could have been sold for at least $400m.

Option 2: Break up the group. We would point out that speculations on the possibility of carving up the group have been denied time and again by F&N’s management at investor and shareholder forums. But we also keep in mind that all too often, corporate Singapore’s standard response to speculation has been “we have no plans to….” until it is ready to announce it, so the value of a denial is not what it used to be. Up the ante on food and beverage. There is a valuation argument to be made for a refocus on F&B. A peer comparison shows that wellfinanced F&B companies with established brands and high ROEs in the region are valued by investors. Nestle (Malaysia), for instance, trades at 27x forward earnings. For the F&B business to stand on its own (assuming the sale of the publishing business), it makes sense for F&N to take full control of FNHB and consolidate the earnings based on a 100% interest in the Malaysia-listed entity.


Based on the current market price for FNHB, the remaining 42.6% interest in the company which F&N does not own carries a price tag of $846m (net of cash and debt). F&N’s group cash balance of $1.7b as of June 2011 includes $900m in unused cash that Temasek Holdings paid to F&N in 2006 for the 14.7% it took. This, coupled with the $4.8b in banking facilities provided by eight relationship banks and $3.4b in Medium Term Note Programs, should provide more than sufficient funding for a major corporate acquisition such as FNHB.


In the meantime, F&N is working to broaden its F&B business. Besides launching new brands and categories of soft drinks for both the export and domestic markets under the soft drinks division, the group is boosting its dairies and ice cream businesses. In October 2010, it acquired a 100% interest in King’s Creameries, a significant ice cream player in Singapore and Malaysia which markets its products under the flagship brand King’s. In August 2010, it ventured into the snack food business, paying RM54.6m for a 23.1% stake in Cocoaland Holdings (listed on Bursa Malaysia), which manufactures and distributes juices.


F&N a takeover target? Never say never. Another value-enhancing factor to the F&B business is F&N’s exposure to the attractive breweries business through its 39.7% stake in Asia Pacific Breweries (APB). F&N and Dutch brewer Heineken hold equal stakes in Asia Pacific Investments Pte Ltd, which, in turn, owns 64.8% of APB. Separately, F&N and Heineken have direct stakes of 7.3% and 9.5%, respectively. In our view, there is unlikely to be a change to the APBHeineken stalemate unless F&N undergoes a massive restructuring.


To recap, the market has long speculated that Heineken may launch a hostile takeover bid for APB against its strategic partner and fellow shareholder F&N, or even try to take over F&N itself. The Dutch brewer had been frustrated by a 1931 agreement that forbade it from setting up breweries in Asia except through APB (which, for obvious reasons, is keener on promoting its own Tiger brand). Heineken had a run-in with F&N and APB in 2006 when it sued the duo over the right to appoint the CEO to run the China operations, and we suspect the speculation may have its roots in that event. Further, Heineken has made it no secret that it desires a larger stake in APB, if the price is right.


A Heineken takeover attempt of F&N is more likely only if F&N disengages itself from businesses that are unrelated to beer and which Heineken will not be interested in, namely, property, printing and publishing, and soft drinks.


However, there is a reason why a takeover bid by Heineken may not happen so easily: The entry of Japanese brewer, Kirin Holdings, as a major shareholder could act as a shield against a hostile move by Heineken. For that matter, F&N may even find itself being the subject of a tussle for control between Kirin and Heineken should they decide to attempt a takeover.


Relisting property business at the right price. F&N’s property business is no small affair. It has 15 residential projects currently under development, a landbank of 30m sq ft (estimated gross development value of $10b), more than 25 commercial properties and over 69 serviced residence properties across 23 countries. Revenue and PBIT for property hit a record high in FY Sep10 at $1.9b and $0.6b, respectively.


F&N paid below-NTA valuation of 0.93x P/NTA to privatise Centrepoint Properties in 2001. While it may be possible to relist its property business, we view this as a longer-term catalyst given that the average valuation for blue chip property stocks like CapitaLand, Keppel Land and City Developments currently stands at just about 1x NTA compared to bull market valuation of around 2x NTA. All said, it is evident that there are numerous ways for F&N to extract greater value for its shareholders and staying as a conglomerate is by no means the best option.